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The paper takes off from the debate of Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr on the 
position of philosophy of education, whether it could rightly be seen as a 
practical discipline or it is exclusively theoretical. While taking precautions 
on a hasty submission, the paper first examined some conceptions on the 
nature of theory and arrived at a definition of theory as a body of knowledge 
that is foundational and fulfils the function of describing, explaining and 
stipulating certain issues or problems. This makes theory comparable to 
practice, which is overt demonstration of what is known to serve a desired 
purpose. Practical activity was viewed from deliberate and non-deliberate 
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perspectives and the submission was made that in either way, the practical 
rests on theoretical foundations. The paper also examined methods of 
theorising and observed that all the traditional methods of knowledge 
acquisition hold for theorising. The paper concludes on the submission that 
philosophy of education in its content and method is theoretical but must 
form a link with practicalities to be relevant to life. 
Keywords: Education, theory, practice, dichotomy 
Introduction 
An issue of clarification on theory and practice becomes impelling judging 
by exposition of learners to various types of theories ranging from the 
scientific, philosophical, psychological, sociological, anthropological and the 
educational among many other areas of learning. As a matter of fact, every 
course of study is presumably theory-laden in the sense that it has its basis in 
some theories and is prone to establishment of new theories. Education as a 
theory-laden concept permeates every discipline and one would imagine 
therefore that every theory would bear a tant of education. This is to say that 
theories in themselves are educative. 
Hirst & Carr (2005) squared up to each other on the relationship of 
philosophy and education with of theory and practice. This was prior to the 
Annual Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society held at Oxford in 
2005. Hirst contented that the focus of philosophy of education is to abstract 
and subject to rational scrutiny some aspects of the practices of education, 
thereby drawing out theories on education and that philosophy of education is 
theoretical. 
Carr (2005) maintained that we need to see philosophy of education as a kind 
of practical philosophy that is central to the development of national 
educational practices. The debate seemed to be hinged on the term ‗practical‘ 
as applicable and appropriate to philosophy and hence philosophy of 
education. This paper is not out to settle scores with Hirst Paul and Carr 
Wilfred on their positions as such, rather it would infer from the two 
positions the place and prominence of theory in both philosophy and 
education since both of them still see philosophy of education as theory 
prone. Their arguments and commentaries shall constitute the body of 
literature for this paper. 
Hirst said precisely: 
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Philosophy, like psychology, sociology and history is an abstract, 
academic, theoretical discipline that is a hugely significant 
instrument in contributing to the exercise of practical reason in 
educational affairs and the progressive experimental development of 
practices that best pursue that particular form of good in our 
complex society… The philosophy of education then… should 
contribute philosophically by the use of theoretical reason as 
developed in academic pursuit of philosophy to the national 
development of the activities and discourse of educational practice 
by the use of practical reason. 
Here, Hirst admitted the theoretical nature of philosophy with its propensity 
to contributing rationale to the development of the practicalities in education. 
Carr, in his own case, went beyond seeing philosophy merely as an 
abstracting academic theoretical discipline. He attributed to it a consciously 
performed and culturally embedded human activity that is by nature practical. 
He contended: 
Evaluating the ‗rational validity‘ of educational practice is thus not 
as Hirst believes, a complex task that is ‗difficult‘ to achieve, but an 
impossible task that can never be achieved. It can never be achieved 
because the theoretical knowledge that is used to ‗justify‘ 
educational practice is itself always an abstraction from practice and 
hence infected by those very features of practice… The philosophy 
of education cannot inform educational practice because it is itself a 
form of practice. 
Carr maintained the possibility and existence of practical philosophy while 
Hirst (2005) upheld the position that philosophy is essentially theoretical and 
concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the 
conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presupposition of all forms 
of theoretical understanding engendered in the exercise of theoretical reason, 
including those of philosophy itself and all forms of practice engendered in 
the exercise of practical reason. But Carr (2005) maintained that to continue 
to cling to a conception of philosophy as a theoretical discipline does not so 
much draw on recent developments in philosophy as ignored them. 
This point would seriously make one usher in a remark that it is not an error 
to ignore some recent developments if such developments would introduce 
confusion rather than clarity since the question remains unanswered: In what 
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sense is philosophy practical? Practical activities are offshoots of the 
intellectual ones that determine them. Philosophy as an intellectual activity is 
not practical; rather it is the springboard for every practical activity. 
Carr however insisted on the possibility of practical philosophy, tracing its 
origin to Aristotle‘s analysis of ‗phronesis‘ and ‗praxis‘. For Aristotle, 
‗phronesis‘ is a moral and intellectual virtue that is inseparable from practice 
and constitutive of the moral consciousness of those whose actions are rooted 
in a disposition to do ‗the right thing at the right time and in the right way‘ 
(MacIntyre, 1981). It is thus a mode of ethical reasoning. On the other hand, 
‗praxis‘ is simple a practical exhibition of how the idea of ‗the good‘ is being 
conceived and understood. The ‗good‘ as a concept is derived from 
experiencing in practical terms what is good. Both Aristotle‘s ‗phronesis‘ and 
‗praxis‘ harmonise to breed practical thinking on ethics. This, according to 
Carr, was the beginning of practical philosophy (Carr, 2006). He maintained 
that the embedment of ‗phronesis‘ in ‗praxis‘ and its inseparability from the 
concrete situations in which it is applied indicates that it is only sustainable 
by practical philosophy. 
The question of what is practical in philosophy would yet remain unanswered 
unless one tries to perceive it from the perspective of the behaviour of 
thinking in which case the practical activity of thinking is what is understood 
as philosophy, but philosophy does not consist in the procedural ways of 
thinking rather it is the rational outcome of thinking on terms, ideas and 
concepts to build a body of knowledge. The conception of practical 
philosophy would rather sound ambiguous to the explorative mind that 
considers philosophy as identifiable with knowledge in any form an inquiry 
takes whether the form is by nature, practical or theoretical. 
Nature of theory 
The term ‗Theory‘ could be used to refer to stipulations and instructions that 
are meant to guide some specific activities, as exemplified in formulae and 
procedures for working mathematical problems. The term could also assume 
the embodiment of oral or written ideas on a particular issue as distinguished 
from its practical dimensions, as exemplified in the theory of driving or 
theory of automobile engineering as distinguishable from the practical 
dimensions. Again, it could refer simply to rule of conduct as in moral theory 
or social theory compared to practical behaviour. Again, the term ‗Theory‘ 
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could assume the thesis that is made out of research findings. These are 
among possible connotations. 
Kneller (1971) in his discussion of contemporary education theories ascribed 
two meanings to the word ‗Theory‘. According to him, the word can refer to 
a hypothesis or a set of hypotheses that have been verified by observation or 
experiment and it can also refer to systematic thinking or a set of coherent 
thoughts. Kneller‘s first meaning of theory corresponds to the fourth 
alternative meaning stated above, while his second meaning corresponds to 
the second alternative meaning. It is presupposed that other meanings given 
to the term ‗Theory‘ would bear upon any or a combination of some of the 
meanings stated in the last paragraph. 
O‘Connor (1980) remarked that the word ‗Theory‘ is used vaguely and 
ambiguously to carry several but related meanings. From the remark, one 
would observe that no single restricted meaning can be given to the word 
‗Theory‘. A central point to make, however, is that theory as a concept is 
foundational in nature. In this sense, it provides a base for other thoughts and 
activities. In a more general sense therefore foundational courses such as 
history, psychology, sociology, anthropology and philosophy among others 
are perceived as essential theoretical. As a foundational thought theory fulfils 
certain functions namely to describe, explain and stipulate. These three 
functions are interconnected in the sense that one derives from an in turn 
leads to the other. A theory is built up from facts or events through a 
description of the matter or events and explanation of same in a 
comprehensive language. The theory then becomes a principle of exploration 
of further knowledge on the matter or on similar matters; this is the 
stipulative aspect of the theory. 
For example, scientific theories develop through a description of some forces 
in nature as they impress on the human intellect and these are explained in 
terms of their meaning and possible relevance to human condition and they 
become stipulative in the sense that they become yardsticks for determining 
new experiences. 
There is a question to ask, ‗Do theories assume the same nature in all 
disciplines?‘ Every discipline, one would say, lends itself to theorising and 
hence we have theories in linguistics, philosophy, sciences, mathematics, 
anthropology, sociology, psychology among many others, and of course, 
education. A critical reflection on such theories as Einstein‘s theory of 
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relativity in physics, or theory of realism in philosophy, among others, leaves 
one to question whether the concept ‗theory‘ assumes the same meaning in 
every discipline.  
Generally, theories develop from hypotheses after they might have been 
tested through the use and application of dialectics, logic and statistics among 
other rational tools. Hypotheses are assumptions and they do no more than 
offer probabilities on what constitute knowledge. Epistemically, hypothesis is 
nothing but unjustified belief, it is simply a starting point for knowledge 
inquiry. Hypotheses conclude as theories after they have been tested, 
verified, and accepted as principles and rules of procedure to analyse, predict 
or explain the nature or behaviour of a specific phenomenon. 
Sax (1968) described theory as a unified system of principles, definitions, 
postulates and observations organised in such a way as to most explain the 
interrelationship between the variables. What is pertinent here is that a theory 
can harmonise some of the features in any discipline. By way of summation 
therefore a theory can assume a principle, policy, belief, speculation, 
explanation and opinion among other variables. The variables that describe 
theory make it foundational to laws and other ideas. As to the question raised 
on unification of nature of theory in every discipline one would uphold that 
theories remain foundational to every discipline irrespective of their 
peculiarities. 
Theory-practice dichotomy 
Whatever position one may take regarding the understanding of theory, the 
concept is explainable in the context of an in relation to the practical. A 
disparity between theory and practice is traceable to Dewey‘s attribution of 
the problem to Greek culture of division of experience into temporal and 
extra-temporal categories. Dewey (1916) conceived the Greek notion of 
‗idea‘ as a spirited view of the world. This inquires into a difference between 
ideating on experience and practically acquiring one. He saw this distinction 
as creating two genetic forms of understanding on the concepts ‗theory‘ and 
‗practice‘. Dewey‘s position was to establish the two as inherently connected. 
This implies that one is conceivable and explainable in the context of the 
other. Dewey however seemed to have carried too far the Greek distinction 
between idea and practice. The distinction may not be as sharp as he 
portrayed it. The theory-practice distinction may be explainable in the 
analogy of a building, which for convenience may be labeled ‗Experience‘ 
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with theory constituting the foundation and practice represented by the walls 
and the roof. 
The foundation of the building is distinguishable from the rest of the 
structure but not separable from it. In the same way, the theory is 
distinguishable as a foundation for practice but not separable from it. It is 
conceptionally distinguishable but essentially part of it. Since a theory is 
ingrained in a practice, one may therefore ask in what way whether every 
practice requires a foundation theory, like in the case of human activities that 
are practical and integral to living. Human activities can be classified into: 
‗deliberate‘ and non-deliberate‘ acts. This may not be taken as an established 
classification but simply a description of two perspectives to examining and 
understanding them. Deliberate acts are sourced from human volition while 
non-deliberate acts are output of circumstances or situations. A practice 
activity, whether deliberate or non-deliberate, is explainable to some 
underlying working principle. This inevitably becomes the theory for the 
activity. 
For example, natural human activities like walking and talking may be 
theorised by the process of carrying them out which is simply a description of 
the movement of the legs, one head of the other to move the entire body from 
one place to another. This is one sense of theorising on walking. Similarly 
talking may be theorised as the process of the movement of the lips and 
tongue to gush out sounds that compose into a language. These natural 
activities can be further theorised from various perspectives to knowledge. 
To imagine whether there can be a practical activity that lacks a theoretical 
base, would be in the negative since every activity is founded on a working 
principle. Thinking in essence yields theorising while doing entails 
practicalising. In as much as ability to do is dependent on and controlled by 
ability to think, then it is inconceivable that there is a practice without a 
theory at its base. 
The common views of Somekh (2003) and perhaps of others is the dilemma 
of making a distinction between theory and practice, coupled with the danger 
involved in rendering a wrong, or at least, an inappropriate distinction. One 
point is however clear, it is that theory and practice are interrelated cognitive 
experiences that are springboards for knowledge acquisition and utilisation is 
a pre-occupation of philosophy. 
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In a more scientific sense a theory is expected to establish clarity of thought 
from which new practices can develop. This invariably becomes a matter for 
new knowledge. Scientific laws often times spring up as theories on nature 
and natural occurrences since they are conclusions derived from systematic 
findings. 
Again, theories that may be ascribed as scientific are not limited to verified 
propositions in the discipline of the sciences. Any theory in any discipline 
can be so described when adjudged as knowledge prone. The scientific nature 
of theory therefore is the propensity to offer precision of thought and 
certainty on a particular subject matter. 
In his understanding of Aristotle‘s distinction between theory and practice in 
the topics, Blondel (2000) explained an action as understandable in three 
terms, which are production, theory and practice. Every action supposedly 
stems from theory, which is the contemplation in a strong and technical sense 
on ways to carry out the action, then follows the practice which is the 
demonstration of the premeditated way, and lastly production, which is the 
expressive output of the demonstration. This understanding, even though, 
merely descriptive but not explanatory enough of the tripartite nature of 
action, clearly establishes theory as a foundation for practice and 
consequently for production. 
Every proposition carries the propensity for knowledge, but does not become 
knowledge until it is certified in truth. Since it has been argued that a theory 
is a body of knowledge that constitutes a foundation for further knowledge 
and experience, an unverified proposition may therefore not be a theory since 
it has not been established as knowledge. On a similar note, it is not every 
knowledge that becomes a theory. What makes a body of knowledge 
theoretical is its propensity to offering new knowledge, in which case it 
becomes a working principle from which to make out new knowledge. 
For one to be capable of establishing a theory, one needs to possess aptitude 
for research to discover some truths of world realities. These truths remain as 
facts at the first instance, then in addition to this one needs to be able to 
harmonise these facts into a body of knowledge to serve as foundation for 
further knowledge. This is possible through the ability to make logical 
connections of these facts to emerge with propositions that would prove as 
knowledge. Some facts remain merely at the level of identification of 
relativities. Such facts of identity as one may call them, are exemplified in 
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such statements as, ‗A blind person is the one who cannot see‘, ‗A bachelor 
is an unmarried man‘, and ‗There are seven days in a week‘, among others. 
Statements of this nature say nothing more than describe some phenomena to 
their identities. There is nothing theoretical about them. 
But if one considers such statement as, ‗The multiple of two and three is six‘, 
‗Whatever goes up must come down‘, and ‗A child is born from the womb of 
a woman‘ among others, one would uphold that those statements are 
theoretical in the sense that they are expressive of principles of operation or 
occurrence that would yield the same experience under repeatable similar 
conditions. Theories in the arts, the sciences and various disciplined, as a 
matter of fact, assume this nature. 
Apart from propositions that are scientifically validated and justified as 
theories, proverbs and wise sayings, could serve a theoretical purpose. This is 
because many of such statements express realities that would remain the 
same when subjected to the same conditions. Ability to theorise therefore 
would depend to a great extent on competence in recognising facts, and 
aptitude in the use of language and logic to organise the facts into principles 
of regular occurrence. Theories are epistemic in nature, hence all the sources 
of knowledge contribute to building of them. These include sensation, reason, 
intuition, introspection and memory among others. Ideas that develop 
through these means do not become theories until they are veridically 
ascertained. 
O‘Connor (1980) again ascribed to educational theory three components 
namely the metaphysical, value judgment and the empirical components. The 
metaphysical component is observable in statements that are acceptable in 
respect of their meaning and logical structure. They are statements that 
uphold phenomena as they are. The value judgment component of theories 
consists in statements that are upheld because of the values they are set to 
preserve. What is crucial to such statements is their justification as values. 
The empirical component of theories however, consists in statements that are 
capable of being supported by evidence of the sense. 
Actually, what O‘Connor referred to as component here may be better 
understood as dimensions to theorising since each of them needs not feature 
in every theory and a theory would suffice as one when it assumes any or a 
combination of these features. In respect of aptitude for theorising, it would 
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be acknowledgeable of a theorist to show competence in making out 
knowledge from the perspectives of these theory dimensions. 
Method of theorising 
Ordinarily, it may sound appealing to believe that theory is what anybody can 
postulate and maintain, yet it may not be proper to see it as a thing one can 
arbitrarily do. There are some steps to take in doing it even though the steps 
may not be stereotyped. 
A first consideration of the methods of theorising would examine ways by 
which statements of belief are postulated and validated as knowledge. The 
traditional ways of knowledge acquisition hold for theory making. These 
include the empirical way by which knowledge is obtained through sensation 
and the rational way which makes use of reason to acquire knowledge. Other 
traditional ways include intuition by which knowledge is gained through 
insight and revelation which sources knowledge from inspiration and 
contemplation. These are among other possible categories.  
Theory making may not exclusively depend on a single way of knowing, 
rather it would be better seen as a composite of two or more ways. For 
example, the senses do no more than identify certain things in nature, it is 
through the complementary activity of reason that things identified have 
meaning and relationships are established in theory. Equally, the experience 
of intuition or revelation which is closely allied to sensation is introspective 
and requires the use of reason to make meanings and establish relationships 
into a theory. In a more scientific way, the methods of knowledge acquisition 
agglomerate as identification, verification, justification and evaluation of 
contents of the mind. Every theory springs up from the mind and the mind 
needs to go through these steps to emerge with one. The steps shall be 
analysed briefly. 
At the onset of a person‘s intellectual experience, the mind identifies an 
issue, object or a problem. Through the process of reasoning, it seeks to 
clarify the matter by giving it meaning through an interpretation it gives to it, 
verifies the authenticity of the interpretation and adduces to it certain values 
of speculated solutions in the case of a problem. The next thing is for the 
mind to justify the speculated values or solutions to ascertain their relevance 
to human situation.  
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Finally, the mind evaluates the worthiness of the values in terms of 
consistency through times. The objects of the mind‘s experience, the values 
ascribed to them as well as the evaluations made on them are ideational and 
on them theories develop, hence they are stated as propositions which are 
subject to change since ideas and experiences change with time. Theories are 
value-laden propositions that may be subject to change. 
Ideas, as Oladipo (2002) put it, ‗Are not formed or instituted as ends in 
themselves rather they are formed or instituted with a view to providing an 
orientation in life or aspects of it.‘ Ideas are therefore stated first as 
propositions to provide some orientations on the issues at stake. Thereafter, 
the propositions are justified and evaluated as theories for universal 
application in similar situations. Again, such theories could be revisited from 
time to time to amend or even develop new set of theories from them. It 
much depends on ability to engage in critical thinking on existing theories to 
bring about new ones. 
Conclusion 
This paper attempts to critically examine the intellectual views on the 
discourse of their and the position of philosophy on the matter, the two 
conflicting positions of Carr and Hirst, one of which ascribes practicality to 
philosophy as a deviation from the old view of seeing philosophy as 
exclusively theoretical. A possible median position is that philosophy in its 
content and method is theoretical while it serves practical purposes to be 
relevant to life. In as much as a theory needs to be practicable to be relevant, 
philosophy must form a link with some practicalities to be worthwhile, hence 
philosophy of education, as it is the case with philosophy of science, religion 
or any other discipline becomes relevant to the discipline in lieu of its 
predetermined practical purposes. 
Ordinarily, the engagement of reason on abstract issues and terms would be a 
futile exercise if there is no predetermined goal it serves. The goals of 
philosophy as manifest in various disciplines provide the practical 
dimensions to it. Even in the case where philosophy is studied for its own 
sake, it has its presumed practical goal as may manifest in a person‘s 
behavioural response to issues and problems. 
Education too is a discipline that carries both theoretical and practical 
dimensions. Philosophy of education thus provides theoretical base for 
practicalities in education. Actually, it is inconceivable to talk of education 
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theory that is devoid of philosophy. It is comparable to a house without a 
foundation. Theories in education have their philosophical components, 
irrespective of the perspectives to studying it. The historical, psychological, 
sociological and economical perspectives to theorising on education, among 
others, involve the exercise of philosophy in as much as it rationally 
examines issues and logically build up systems of thought for educational 
operations. Every conclusion drawn from a philosophical discourse on 
education inevitably becomes a theory in education since it would serve as a 
foundation for educational practices and further thought development on 
education. 
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